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Contra Eunomium III 10 – Who is Eunomius?1 
Morwenna Ludlow 
 
 This paper will first give an overview of the contents of CE III 10, before commenting in more 
detail on Gregory’s characterisation of his opponent, Eunomius.  I hope to show that an understanding 
of this feature in particular helps one to understand the structure and purpose of this concluding part of 
CE III.  
 
I. Summary of the arguments of Book 10 
 In book 10, Gregory of Nyssa deals with two main arguments or challenges presented by 
Eunomius: the first (1) concerns the question of whether the Father can truly be called the Son’s ‘God’ 
(§§1-17); the second (2) discusses the various meanings of ‘light’ as applied to Father and Son in the 
Bible (§§18-49).  Gregory responds to the latter by accusing Eunomius of (i) failing to correctly 
understand Scripture’s use of the word ‘light’ (§§18-25); (ii) having a doctrine of the incarnation which 
implied that the either the Son was evil or the Father was inferior to the Son (§§26-44), and (iii) 
succumbing to precisely that heresy which he accuses the Cappadocians of holding, that is, the idea that 
God is composite (§§46-9). 
 
1. The Father is ‘not only the Father of the Only-begotten, but... his God’. 
As Ekkehard Mühlenberg notes,2 the only place in CE where Gregory not only accuses Eunomius of 
blasphemy, but also calls him the Antichrist is the close of book 9 (CE III 9.64), shortly after Gregory 
quotes Eunomius’ claim that the Father is ‘not only the Father of the Only-begotten, but... his God’ (CE 
III 9,61).  Perhaps Gregory took this to be the Eunomius’ most blunt assertion of the inequality between 
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the Father and the Son.  In any case, he picks up the claim in CE III 10, announcing that he will discuss 
the argument Eunomius uses to support it, an argument which Gregory calls the ‘chief point (to\ 
kefa&laion) in support of their doctrine’ (CE III 10,1). 
 What was this argument?  It appears that Eunomius quoted John 10:17 (‘Jesus said to her, “Do 
not hold on to me, because I have not yet ascended to the Father. But go to my brothers and say to 
them, ‘I am ascending to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God’.” ’) in order to claim that 
‘either the disciples are of one essence with the Father’ (which is clearly ludicrous) ‘or the Son is not of 
the same essence with the Father but serves his “God” in the same sense as the disciples do’.3  In CE III 
10,1-17 Gregory discusses the interpretation of this (and related) verses; his exegesis is framed by his 
contrast of Eunomius’ blasphemous and futile theology with what Gregory claims to be the ‘truly 
religious’ and traditional interpretation of the verse (§§1 and 17).4  This pious and traditional approach 
consists in interpreting the phrases ‘my father and your father’ and ‘my God and your God’ in the light 
of the divine oi0konomi/a.5  Consequently, Gregory gives his reader a potted summary of the history of 
salvation from creation and the Fall (§10), to the incarnation and Christ’s saving work (§11-12) and 
finally the resurrection after which Jesus proclaims the glad news of the divine economy to Mary (§13-
14).  Whereas Eunomius applied Christ’s words ‘my God and your God’ to his non-human nature and 
thus allegedly intended ‘to demolish the glory of the Only-Begotten’,6 Gregory’s exegesis applies them 
to Christ’s human nature (§§9 and 17).   
 This pattern of interpreting descriptions of Christ according to the economy of salvation fits with 
Gregory’s strategy throughout CE III, as other contributors to this volume have noted.7  But Gregory 
implies that this is no mere grammatical point.  Christ, in becoming human, became the first-fruits of a 
salvation which will apply to all; not only was the incarnation itself part of God’s economy of salvation, 
but the particular way in which it was announced had a purpose too:  ‘when we hear that the true God 
and Father has become Father and God of our First-fruits, we no longer doubt that the same one has 
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Extant Works Richard Paul Vaggione, ed. and tr. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p.126; see also n.56.  
4
 CE III 10,1: th|= blasfhmi/a|.CE III 10,2: th\n… eu0sebh=… dia/noian which is pro/dhlon… toi=j paradecame/noij e0n a)lhqei/a| 
th\n pi/stin.CE III 10, 17: every pious person (pa/nta… to\n eu0sebou=nta) will agree that compared to Gregory’s 
interpretation Eunomius’ is completely futile (pa/ntwj a)rgei=n). 
5
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become our Father and God too, when we learn that we shall enter the same place, where Christ has 
entered for our sake as forerunner’ (§15, my emphasis).  According to Gregory, even the announcement 
of this to a woman was appropriate to God’s economic scheme (§16).  The stress that Gregory puts on 
the fittingness of the particular words Christ spoke and the appropriateness of his particular addressee 
suggests a relation in Gregory’s mind between the general divine economy of salvation and the 
particular economy of Christ’s teaching.  This connection might reflect the use of the term oi0konomi/a in 
rhetoric.  ‘At the core of oi0konomi/a is the notion of accommodation to circumstance, whether in the 
daily management of an estate… or in God’s providential concern for his creatures as seen in the 
Incarnation’.  From this core meaning came the application of the term oi0konomi/a to the 
accommodation of words to a specific purpose, context and audience.8  For Gregory, therefore, the 
effectiveness of Jesus’ discourse stands for the effectiveness of his whole role in the divine economy.  
 A second, less obvious, but no less significant result of Gregory’s exegesis of John 10:17 is that it 
implicitly distinguishes different senses of the word ‘son’: Son of God, Only-Begotten of the Father; 
humans as sons of God by virtue of their creation by God; that sonship rejected in favour of becoming 
adoptive sons of the devil; humans newly-adopted by God as his sons.9  The one who was truly Son of 
God, and thus God too, took on himself that sonship which all humans once had but lost and restored it 
back to them.  It is that sense of shared human sonship under God that Jesus Christ evokes when he 
refers to his ‘God’ and ‘Father’.  Again, this technique of distinguishing several different meanings of a 
word (often according to his understanding of the divine economy) is typical of Gregory.10 
 
2. ‘As much as the Begotten is separate from the Unbegotten, so is the Light distinguished from the 
Light’.  
 That Eunomius himself used a similar technique is evident from Gregory’s second challenge in 
which he discusses Eunomius’ distinction of different kinds of light (§§18-25).  Gregory first quotes 
Eunomius’ words: ‘as much as the Begotten is separate from the Unbegotten, so is the Light 
distinguished from the Light’ (§18).  This is a passage from Eunomius’ Apology, which had already been 
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addressed in Basil of Caesarea’s Against Eunomius.11  Eunomius seems to have adopted the idea of a 
sliding scale of divinity in which the Begotten is less than the Unbegotten and the Light of the Son is 
consequently less than that of the Father.  In reply, Basil used a reductio ad absurdum: logically, he 
argued, Begotten is the opposite of Unbegotten; so if Eunomius were to be consistent, then the Light of 
the Son would be opposed to the Light of the Father – in other words it would not be light at all, but 
darkness.12   
 We know that Eunomius reported Basil’s reductio ad absurdum in his  Apology for the Apology, 
for Gregory quotes it right at the end of CE III: 
 ‘Yes’, [Eunomius] says, ‘but if, since “begotten” is the opposite of “unbegotten”, the 
begotten Light meets the unbegotten Light on equal terms, the one will be light, the other 
darkness.’13 
At that point, Gregory merely laughs at Eunomius.  He seemingly praises him for his ‘sharpness and 
accuracy’,14 but immediately undercuts that by pointing out that this quotation is in fact a paraphrase of 
Basil’s own words.15  Eunomius can only be logical, Gregory implies, when he is citing someone else.   
 We will return later to the rhetorical effect of that tactic.  Here we focus on CE III 10,18-25, 
where Gregory describes how Eunomius actually responded to the challenge posed by Basil’s reductio 
ad absurdum.  Apparently, in his subsequent Apology for the Apology, Eunomius tried to avoid the 
absurd conclusion set out by Basil by asserting that there are different senses of the word ‘light’ in the 
Bible: Gregory quotes him as distinguishing the ‘true light’ (Christ, John 1,9); the light created in the 
beginning (Gen 1,3); the disciples who are the ‘light of the world’ (Matt 5,14); and the ‘unapproachable 
light’ (the Father, 1 Tim 6,16: §19).  With this focus on several kind of light, Eunomius seems to have 
tried to avoid the dilemma that Basil constantly tried to force on him (either the Son is truly light, or not 
at all; either the Son is fully divine, or not at all).  Rather, Eunomius claims that the Son is light to the 
extent that he ‘illuminate[s] people’ so that they can know the transcendent light.16 
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i. Operations.   
 One way of attacking Eunomius here would be to remind him of an argument he used in relation 
to the words genetos and agennetos: that is, that things with different names must be different things.17  
If the converse were true (the same name indicates same things), then ‘light’ would identify some 
identical property shared by both Father and Son.  In fact, Gregory returns to this kind of argument later 
(§46).  Here, however, such an argument would be weak, because clearly both Gregory and Eunomius in 
fact agree that there is a fundamental difference between created and uncreated light.  Consequently, 
Gregory focuses on the idea (also espoused by Eunomius) that things with the same operation must be 
the same; things with different operations are different.18  Gregory asserts that Eunomius implicitly 
distinguishes created light from the disciples’ light by their means of operation (kata_ to_n th~j 
e0nergei/aj tro&pon, §21): the former is material and the latter intellectual.  He then challenges his 
opponent to distinguish the light of the Father and the Son by their operations (Gregory, of course, 
thinks that this is impossible: §21).  Next, however, he develops his own variation of Basil’s reductio ad 
absurdum, challenging Eunomius to explain how, if Begotten is the opposite of Unbegotten, ‘true’ (light) 
can be opposed to ‘unapproachable’ (light).  ‘True’ is not the opposite of ‘unapproachable’, unless 
‘unapproachable’ means ‘unapproachable by the truth’, i.e. false – which would deny everything that 
Eunomius claims about the Father.  According, to Eunomius’ concept of God, the Father must be 
‘unapproachable by falsehood’, in which case the Father is ‘true’.  Thus ‘true’ and ‘unapproachable’ in 
fact mean the same thing and indicate the same quality in the Father and the Son (§§22-4).   
ii. The incarnation and divine power. 
 Next, Gregory reports Eunomius’ claim about John’s prologue: if the ‘light’ of verses 4-5 was the 
Word that became flesh, how could that light be the same light as the light of the Father, given that the 
incarnate ‘lived by human laws, or was crucified’? (§§26-9, quoting Eunomius’ words in §29).  Gregory’s 
reply is to accuse Eunomius of thinking that the incarnation itself was an absurdity and he presents his 
opponent with a dilemma.  If, as Eunomius apparently claims, it was in the nature of the Son but not of 
the Father to become incarnate, then either the Father was powerless to become incarnate (which 
destroys Eunomius’ claims about the superiority of the Father); or the Son shares the weaknesses, even 
the evils, of the world in which he became incarnate (§§30-4).  Gregory plays with Eunomius’ argument 
that the Son ‘acted’ (e0nh/rghsen), while the Father was ‘inactive’ (a)nene/ghton) with regard to this 
operation (e0nergei/a - i.e. the incarnation), twisting and stretching Eunomius’ vocabulary to imply that 
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the Father’s lack of involvement in one particular operation makes him generally powerless (see the 
quotation of Eunomius’ words at §36).  After a brief attack on the inconsistency of Eunomius’ use of the 
word ‘true’ (§34-5),19 Gregory plays variations on the theme of this argument in §§36-8 and again in 
§§42-2, in both cases implying that if the Son, but not the Father, could become incarnate then the Son 
is to be ranked higher or praised more than the Father.  These variations are separated by interludes, 
which will be discussed later in this paper.  
iii. Is God composite? 
 Finally, Gregory deals with Eunomius’ claim that if God is a Trinity in the sense that the 
Cappadocians hold, then their God is composite (§§46-9).20  Gregory quotes Eunomius attack on Basil 
from Apology for the Apology: 
[Basil] also makes God composite for us, by suggesting that the Light is common, but that 
[the Father and the Son] are distinct one from another by certain characteristics and 
various differences, for what coincides in one shared aspect, but distinguished by certain 
differences and sets of characteristics, is no less composite.21 
Gregory, somewhat tendentiously, takes Eunomius seems to have conceded, for the sake of argument, 
that ‘light’ indicated something in common to Father and Son.  Eunomius argues: if that were so and if 
the light of the Father and the Son were differentiated by the terms ‘true’ and ‘unapproachable’, then 
Basil’s God would be composite.  That is, Basil’s God would be a composite of that which is held in 
common (koino/thj) and the distinguishing particularities (ta_ i0diwma/ta).   
 Gregory seizes on Eunomius’ alleged ‘concession’ that light might refer to something in common.  
He claims that since Eunomius ‘stipulates in many places’ that ‘names are attached to realities’, then 
Eunomius is at last admitting that light refers to some ‘underlying reality’ (tinoj u9pokeime/nou) in 
common to both Father and Son (§47).  Put more forcefully: if things have the same name, they have 
the same nature (fu/sij): there is identity (tau0tothj) between the two (§47).  Gregory next argues that 
commonality (koino/thj) and individuality (i0dio/thj) do not come together to form a composite.  Rather, 
the essence (ou0si/a) of a thing remains what it is, and its commonality (koino/thj) and individuality 
(i0dio/thj) vis-à-vis other things are attributes (things which are ‘perceived and understood to apply to 
them’); they are not things in themselves (§48).    An illustration of this is the way in which Scripture says 
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that God and humans are good, but distinguishes their goodness by the use of qualifiers: there is, 
therefore, something in common (e1sti ti koino\n) to both God and humans (goodness), but they relate 
to goodness in different ways (God is its fount; humans merely participate in it) and their possession of 
goodness in common is not to be confused with the possession of a common essence (that is to say, 
koino/thj between two things does not amount to their being o9moousi/oj).  Furthermore, Gregory 
states, one cannot conclude that God is composite from that facts that he is both God and good. 
 
II. Ēthos and pathos 
 None of these arguments in fact add very much of substance to what Gregory has already argued 
in CE III – or, indeed, to what Basil argued in his Adversus Eunomium.  What, then, can we learn from CE 
III 10?  This paper will suggest that it is a fascinating example of Gregory’s rhetorical approach to 
theology.  Certain aspects which seem somewhat puzzling from a theological and historical point-of-
view can be illuminated by a deeper understanding of his literary style. 22  Besides asserting that 
Eunomius’ theology is wrong, Gregory is also clearly conveying the idea that it is dangerously wrong.  For 
example, he follows a long heresiological tradition by associating Eunomius with the kind of language 
and imagery standardly used by the fathers for demons – thus giving the impression that Eunomius is 
responsible for, or is an agent of, a kind of demonic deception.  But, as scholars of heresiology have 
pointed out, the association of one’s opponent with the demonic is as much a rhetorical strategy as a 
theological claim.23  Throughout CE III, but particularly in book 1, the climax of book 9, and book 10, 
Gregory seeks to alienate Eunomius from Gregory’s audience and to encourage waverers to side with 
himself.  The most obvious tactic he employs is consistently to label Eunomius’ views as ‘heretical’ or 
‘blasphemous’.24  Sometimes this kind of appellation is pointedly contrasted with the ‘piety’ of the pro-
Nicene party or Eunomius’ words are contrasted with the words of ‘the Apostle’.25  But there is more to 
this than simple name-calling.  It was an assumption of classical and later rhetoric that the speaker 
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would seek to convey to his audience, either directly or indirectly, the untrustworthiness or bad will 
(kakonoia) of his opponent, whilst affirming his own character as honest and good (establishing his 
h=0qoj) in order to secure the good will (e1unoia) of the audience.26  Because disposing the audience well 
towards oneself as speaker [ēthos] was understood as being closely connected to disposing them 
against one’s opponent by stirring up emotion [pathos] against him, ēthos and pathos are often 
discussed together in guides to rhetoric.27  In what follows I shall explain how Gregory seeks to alienate 
Eunomius from his audience, first by following the heresiological tradition of associating his opponent 
with the demonic, secondly by suggesting that Eunomius is a bad philosopher (specifically, a bad 
logician) and thirdly by alleging that he has bad literary style. 
 
1. Eunomius and the demonic 
 Perhaps the most obvious of Gregory’s strategies is the association of Eunomius with the 
demonic.  References to the demonic and to idolatry (which was closely associated with the demonic) 
are absent in CE I, are sparing in CE II, but are found scattered throughout CE III.28  Rebecca Lyman 
suggests that Gregory ‘approached heresy as a matter of sickness or poor education rather than 
[demonic] pollution’ (in contrast to, for example, Athanasius and Gregory’s own brother Peter).29  She is 
right to stress both the rhetorical manner in which Gregory uses various categories to characterise his 
opponent and his use of slurs about Eunomius’ health and training for this purpose.  However, I would 
argue that the traditional Christian association of heresy with the demonic remains and that demonic 
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audience’.  On ēthos in CE III, see Cassin, L’écriture de la polémique, e.g. 268. 
28
 A search by means of the the TLG on-line for the root daim- reveals the following: CE I: no hits ; CE II: 2 hits; CE III: 8  hits.  
A search for the root  ei0dwl- revaled: CE I: no hits ; CE II: 7 hits; CE III: 19  hits. 
29
 Rebecca Lyman, ‘A topography of heresy: mapping the rhetorical creation of Arianism’, in Michel R. Barnes and Daniel H. 
Williams (eds) Arianism after Arius. Essays on the Development of the Fourth Century Trinitarian Conflicts (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1993), 59. Lyman’s analysis comes in the course of a wider survey of the ‘rhetorical creation’ of later Arianism and is of 
necessity very brief; she also focusses almost entirely on CE I, which may explain the absence of references to the demonic.   
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language remains as part of the ‘rhetorical creation’ of Eunomius as an Arian heretic, regardless of 
whether Gregory actually believes Eunomius’ errors are caused by demonic pollution.30  Indeed, as we 
shall see, in Gregory’s polemic the accusations about Eunomius’ training and demonic beliefs are 
mutually supporting. 
 Firstly, Eunomius is associated with pagan religious practice, particularly idolatry.  Gregory here 
follows a long-established Christian tradition which argued that phenomena associated with pagan 
religious practices such as divination were due to the evil and deceptive workings of demons.31  Even 
though prayers addressed to gods appeared to be answered, they were answered by demons who did 
not have the petitioners’ good in mind.32  By Gregory of Nyssa’s day, the accusation of idolatry seems to 
be particularly aimed at those educated people who practised theurgy: devotees think that they can 
move gods to do what they want, but they have in fact become enslaved to demons.33  A clear theme 
running through this kind of accusation is that of deception (a word commonly associated with the 
demons is h( a)pa&th): demons deceive people into thinking that idols were gods, that gods answer 
prayers, that divination work.34    
 This theme is given a very particular spin in CE III 10: a few paragraphs before directly accusing 
Eunomius of deceit (the word a)pa&th or its plural is repeated three times in three lines in §20), Gregory 
recounts the story of the fall – for Christians the archetypal story of deceit (§§10-15).  Strikingly, 
Gregory’s commentary on the narrative (§16) contrasts Satan’s words to Eve with those of Christ to 
Mary: 
                                                     
30
 In fact I think that the dichotomy implied by this sentence is a false one (demonic heresy as a rhetorical construction vs 
heresy ‘really’ caused by demons); see my ‘Not completely evil: the place of demons in Cappadocian theology’, in Journal for 
Early Christian Studies, forthcoming. 
31
 See, e.g. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra fatum [Fat.] GNO 3.2 59,15.  For the earlier tradition, see e.g. Justin Martyr e.g. 2 
Apologia 5.4 (see Annette Yoshiko Reed, 'The trickery of the fallen angels and the demonic mimesis of the divine: aetiology, 
demonology, and polemics in the writings of Justin Martyr', Journal of Early Christian Studies, 12/2 (2004), pp.141-71., 
passim, especially p.144); Origen e.g. Contra Celsum 3.2; 3.25; 5.46; 7.65, as cited by Dale B. Martin, Inventing superstition : 
from the Hippocratics to the Christians (Cambridge, Mass.; London : Harvard University Press, 2004), p.178.  See also Julien 
Ries, 'Cultes païens et démons dans l'apologétique chrétienne de Justin à Augustin', in Julien Ries (ed.), Anges et démons. 
Actes du colloque de Liège et de Louvain-la-Neuve 25-26 novembre 1987 Homo religiosus, 14 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Centre 
d'histoire des religions, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1989), pp.339-341. 
32
 See, for example, the story related in Gregory of Nyssa’s Thaum: responding to a crowd which prays for more space in the 
theatre the local demon causes a plague PG 46, 956,22-48; tr. Maraval §87-88, 
http://www.gregoiredenysse.com/?page_id=86 accessed 10.3.2011. 
33
 See, perhaps most famously, Gregory of Nazianzus’ account of Julian’s supposed enslavement to demons in Or. 4 he is 
deluded by them (77,20);; [#39]; they make him unstable (85,4) and inconsistent (101,6) and ultimately – unsated by the 
animal sacrifices he offers them - they demand to be fed with Julian’s own blood (87,14-19).   
34
 See e.g. Basil Epistula 233:15: the mind deceived by a demon ‘even thinks that wood is not wood but god’ (see also the 
reference to deceptions - toi=j a)patw~sin - in line 13); Gregory of Nyssa, Or. cat. XVIII (esp. line 8: h( tw~n daimo&nwn 
a)pa&th); Gregory of Nyssa, Fat. repeats the phrase the ‘deceptive power of the demons’ twice in 10 lines (GNO 3.2 59,14: h( 
a)pathlh_ tw~n daimo&nwn du&namij) (GNO 3.2 59,24: th_n a)pathlh_n tw~n daimo&nwn e0ne/rgeian). 
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just as, having become at the start minister and advocate of the serpent’s words (tw~n 
tou~ o1fewj lo&gwn… dia&kono&j te kai\ su&mbouloj), she consequently brought a 
beginning of evil upon the world, so, by bearing to the disciples the words of him who had 
slain the rebellious dragon (tou~ qanatw&santoj to_n a)posta&thn dra&konta tou_j 
lo&gouj toi=j maqhtai=j diakomi/sasa), she might become a pioneer of faith for 
mankind…35 
Thus Gregory firmly establishes a contrast not only between devilish deceit and Christian truth, but 
between the mode of the deception/salvation: words.  This continues a theme Gregory had established 
at the end of CE III 9, where again Eunomius’ deceit is described in very verbal terms: 
63. Do you see and understand, you who are dragged off by deceit to destruction (di' 
a)pa&thj), who it is you have set over your souls as instructor? — he debases the holy 
scriptures (ta_j a(gi/aj grafa&j), he changes the divine words (ta_j qei/aj fwna&j)… he 
not only barbs his own tongue (th_n e9autou~ glw~ssan) against us, but also tries to make 
alterations in the holy words themselves (ta_j a(gi/aj fwna&j)…. Do you not yet perceive 
that he lifts himself up against the name we adore (tw|~ o)no&mati), so that in time the 
name (to_ o1noma) of the Lord will not be heard, but there will be brought into the 
churches, instead of Christ, Eunomius? 64. Do you not yet consider that this godless 
proclamation (to_ a1qeon tou~to… kh&rugma) has been published in advance by the Devil 
as a contemplation, preparation, preface (prooi/mion), for the coming of the Antichrist? 
One who strives to prove that his own words (ta_j i0di/aj fwna_j) are more authoritative 
than the sayings of Christ (tw~n… lo&gwn) and to alter the faith away from the divine 
names (tw~n qei/wn o)noma&twn) and the sacramental ceremonies and symbols towards his 
own deceit (ei0j th_n i0di/an a)pa&thn), what else will he be rightly called, if not Antichrist? 
Gregory develops other variations on this theme of verbal deception, including using the imagery of the 
theatre and masks: hence in CE III 9,1-2 he ironically commends Eunomius for having finally ‘removed 
every mask of disguise from the lie’36 and at the end of the work he chides Eunomius for being like an 
actor, not speaking in his own voice but Basil’s (and not doing that very well): ‘I would like to ask him 
who acts our part (to_n tw~n h(mete/rwn u(pokrith_n) either to use our words, or to present his imitation 
(th_n mi/mhsin) of our speech as closely as possible, or else as he has learnt and is able, to use his book to 
argue for himself (e0k tou~ i0di/ou prosw&pou) and not for us.37 
                                                     
35
 CE III 10 16,8-12 
36
 CE III 9,2 e0pei\ de\ panto_j a)pathlou~ proswpei/ou to_ yeu~doj a)pogumnw&saj. 
37
 CE III 10,51 (a play on prosw&pon – person, character, mask – surely being intended here). 
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 Secondly, Eunomius’ theology is demonic in that, according to Gregory, it mixes the divine and 
human – just like the Egyptian idolaters (§§40-2).  Here Gregory moves beyond the common ploy of 
associating a heretic with idolatry (and foreign idolatry at that): his focus is not so much on ‘their 
outlandish idol-making, when they attach certain animal forms to human bodies’, but on what those 
idols symbolise (§41).  In other words, it perhaps reflects not Egyptian religion as such, but various Greek 
philosophical attempts to understand it.38  Gregory suggests that Eunomius’ Christology, according to 
which Christ is ‘ambiguous in nature (e0pamfoteri/zein kata_ th_n fu&sin)’ and has its ‘being combined 
and commingled with opposites (tina summigh~ te kai\ su&gkraton e0k tw~n e0nan-  
ti/wn th_n ou)si/an)’ recalls the explanation given for the Egyptians’ composite idols: they symbolise 
‘their mixed nature (th~j summi/ktou fu&sewj), which they call a daemon’ which ‘does not have divinity 
unmixed or undiluted (ou)k a)mige\j ou)de\ a1kraton)’.39  Like Eunomius’ Begotten one, who ‘both yearns 
for participation in the Good and is diverted towards a disposition subject to passion’, the daemon 
surpasses human nature, but is susceptible to pleasure and pain.40 
 Again, however, Gregory seems to attempt a typically verbal construal of the situation.  
Eunomius clearly does not worship idols – but Gregory alleges that he is as bad as those who do.  He is 
someone who holds the symbolic interpretations of Anubis, Isis or Osiris, ‘while avoiding the names’ 
(tw~n de\ o)noma&twn feido&menoj).41  At one level, this is just accusing a heretic of holding, but not 
admitting to, views which are tantamount to paganism (specifically, the idea of a cosmic intermediary).  
More profoundly, it may be that Gregory is referring to contemporary philosophical debates about the 
status of the Egyptian gods: were they different gods from the Greek pantheon or the same gods 
worshipped under different titles?  Tied up with that debate was the issue  of the particular status of 
divine names: it was difficult for many Platonists to argue that the Egyptian gods were the same gods 
with different names, for their philosophy of language committed them to the idea that names 
‘belonged naturally to their referents’.42  This debate is of course familiar from Basil and Gregory’s 
arguments with Eunomius – so in suggesting that Eunomius in effect worships Egyptian gods but under 
the name of ‘the Begotten’, Gregory is not only accusing his opponent of paganism and idolatry, he is 
                                                     
38
 Plutarch, for example, uses allegory to understand both images of and myths about the Egyptian gods: Plutarch, De Iside et 
Osiride §75; see also Fritz Graf, ‘Plutarch und die Götterbilder’, in Rainer Hirsch-Luipold (ed.), Gott und die Götter bei 
Plutarch: Götterbilder – Gottesbilder – Weltbider, Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten, Band 54 (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2005), 251-266, especially 261.  On Porphyry and Iamblichus disagreeing on the question of cult statues see, Mark J. 
Edwards Culture and Philosophy in the Age of Plotinus (London: Duckworth, 2006), 137.  
39
 Quotations CE III 10 40,5; 7-8 and 10 41,3; 6; see also line7. 
40
 CE III 10 40,8-9; and 10 41,8: h(donh&n te kai\ po&non a)nadexo&menon 
41
 CE III 10 41,15-16. 
42
 Edwards Culture and Philosophy, 142, citing Iamblichus On the Egyptian Mysteries  7.4 (see Iamblichus On the Mysteries 
Emma C. Clarke, John M. Dillon, and Jackson P. Hershbell (trr.) (Atlanta : Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), p.298-303). 
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also accusing him of being inconsistent in his view that particular names denoted particular things or 
beings. 
 
2. Logic  and rhetoric 
 So, Gregory implies that Eunomius is demonic because he deceives and because he is secretly 
idolatrous.  Furthermore, he gives both accusations a ‘spin’ which focuses on Eunomius’ use of 
language: either Eunomius uses it as a technique to deceive or he is inconsistent in his use of it.   It is at 
this point that claims about demonic thought overlap with those about Eunomius’ training.  In 
particular, Gregory draws attention to Eunomius’ claim to precision in theological language (a)kri/beia) – 
a claim which seems to be grounded in Eunomius’ own self-presentation, but which Gregory 
characterises as both obsessive and specious.43  Gregory himself uses the term  a)kribei/a fairly 
frequently in CE III, sometimes he undermines Eunomius’ claim to theological precision, by saying that it 
is empty or childish; often he implies that it is something he and not Eunomius has.44  Most pointedly, 
he claims that Isaiah had a)kribei/a and that only those inspired by the Holy Spirit can interpret Scripture 
a)kribw~j (clearly implying that Eunomius is uninspired).45   
 Gregory connects Eunomius’ claim to ‘precision’ with he alleged tendency to use ‘logic’ or 
‘syllogisms’ or to be ‘technical’. 46  In turn, these latter accusations are treated by Gregory as evidence of 
Eunomius’ ‘Aristotelianism’.47  Here Gregory describes Eunomius’ use of Aristotle, not as cool rational 
logic, but as ‘nonsense’ (lh~ron, line 2): ‘he laboriously makes a lot of noise about the Aristotelian 
classification of beings, and in what we have written elaborates on the kinds and species and 
distinctions and indivisibles, and deploys all the rest of the technical logic (th_n texnologi/an) of the 
Categories to insult our doctrines’.48  Fourth century opponents drew attention to the role of Aristotle in 
Aetius’ and Eunomius’ education49 and consequently modern commentators have tried ascertain to 
                                                     
43
 At CE III 9,54 Gregory quotes Eunomius as claiming that ‘We ourselves, relying on the saints and blessed men, say that the 
“mystery of godliness” (1 Tim 3.16) is not constituted either by the solemnity of the names or by peculiarities of ceremonies 
and sacramental symbols, but by correctness of doctrines (tw~n dogma&twn a)kribei/a|)’.  On the role of Eunomius’ claim to 
a)kri/beia in theological language, see Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus, 46, 253-4, 264. 
44
 Empty: CE III 8,63; childish CE III 5,20; Gregory’s a)kribei/a: e.g. CE III 1,87; 1,113; 2,72; 3,1; 3,13 etc. 
45
 CE III 3,9; 1,42; 10,9. 
46
 See e.g. CE III 10,19: ‘Eunomius tries to refute them by formal logical demonstrations’ (tai=j texnikai=j e0fo&doij tw~n 
a)podei/cewn); 10,20: ‘the elementary flaw in the logic’ (to_n paidiw&dh paralogismo_n tou~ sofi/smatoj). 
47
 CE III 10,50 
48 filopo&nwj th_n  0Aristotelikh_n tw~n o1ntwn diai/resin e0piqrulw~n tw|~ h(mete/rw| lo&gw| e0cei/rgastai ge/nh kai\ ei1dh kai\ 
diafora_j kai\ a1toma kai\ pa~san th_n e0n tai=j kathgori/aij texnologi/an e0pi\ diabolh|~ tw~n h(mete/rwn dogma&twn 
proexeiri/sato. 
49
 Especially with regard to Aetius: Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus, 16; Lim, Public Disputation,116. 
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what extent Eunomius is in fact using Aristotelian logic.50  However, whilst not doubting that they had 
read Aristotle, it is difficult to conclude that Aristotelianism was uniformly characteristic or distinctive of 
Aetius, Eunomius and their followers (notably, Eunomius accused his opponents of being ‘Aristotelian’ 
too!).51  But if the accusations of Aristotelianism and an obsession with a)kri/beia are the result of 
hostile rhetoric, what is their point?  I will suggest that Gregory plays with the notions of Eunomius 
being a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ arguer.  On the one hand, Gregory suggests throughout CE III that actually 
Eunomius is not very expert in that in which he claims expertise: in fact Eunomius is too lax (or 
inconsistent) about his use of language.  For example, as we saw above, Gregory criticises Eunomius’ 
analysis of the word light in the Bible: if Eunomius agrees that the same word (fw~j) denotes the two 
kinds of light (uncreated, intelligible and created, visible light) then he agrees that two things can share 
a word, but not a meaning in common, which – Gregory claims – undermines Eunomius’ wider theory of 
language (§20).  Again, Eunomius is allegedly inconsistent in his use of words which should have the 
same meaning: in the phrase ‘true light’ Eunomius thinks ‘true’ lowers the conception of the Son below 
the Father (who is ‘unapproachable light’), while in the phrase ‘true God’, he assumes that ‘true’ raises 
the conception of God to its highest extent (§35).  Furthermore, Gregory argues, Eunomius makes an 
error about the logical status of words like ‘true’ and ‘unapproachable’: according to Gregory, these 
words are absolute terms which admit of no degrees.52  If the Father is unapproachable, he is 
completely so.  Similarly, the true admits no contamination of the false, or it is not true (§22).  Even 
more so, Gregory contends, genetos and agennetos are logical opposites, so it is nonsense to suggest 
that ‘as much as the Begotten is separate from the Unbegotten, so is the Light distinguished from the 
Light’ (§18).53 
 In addition to accusing Eunomius of bad logic, Gregory implies that Eunomius’ logic reflects his 
theology: he fails to make the right kind of distinctions: he divides (the meaning of ‘true’; the Father 
from Son) where he should admit similarity and he confuses (‘light’ and ‘light’; the Son and creation) 
where he should admit distinction.  Gregory sometimes uses Basil’s tactic of arguing that Eunomius’ 
                                                     
50
 For useful surveys, see Michel R. Barnes, The power of God : Dunamis in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian theology 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 5-6 and Richard Lim, Public Disputation, Power and Social 
Order in Late Antiquity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 122-6.   
51
 For example, Lim connects Aetius’ training in Aristotle with his medical training in Alexandria, but denies that the use of 
Aristotle’s Categories were widely read in Eunomius’ circle (Lim, Public Disputation,116, 131). For Gregory of Nyssa reporting 
that Eunomius accused Basil of Aristotelianism (with regard to e0pi/noia) see CE II 403-12, especially 411, cited by e.g. Lim, 
Public Disputation,123 and Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus, 92. 
52
 §22 ‘The true and the unapproachable are equally repellent of contrary concepts. As truth admits no admixture of 
falsehood, so the unapproachable does not allow anything contrary to come near.’ 
53
 CE III 10 52: ‘So just as living is not a declining from not living, but total opposition, so we reckon that having been begotten 
is not a decline from not having been begotten, but its contradiction and absolute antithesis, so that what is signified in each 
has nothing in common with the other in any way whether small or large.’ 
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‘Begotten’ is either fully God or not God at all (i.e. Basil accuses Eunomius of worshipping a created 
being or setting the Son against the Father in a quasi-Manichaean theology)54; however, his main tactic 
– in CE III at least – is to argue that Eunomius’ ‘Begotten’ is an in-between being, or a mixed being.  He is 
heavy with his sarcasm in noting that Eunomius, in order to ‘protect’ the Father from pathos, has 
described a Son who is divine, but is himself somehow sullied with the passion of the world.55  Again, 
Gregory ‘verbalises’ this accusation: just as Eunomius’ theology presents a mixed-up Son, so his logic is 
tainted: ‘why do you link incompatible things in your books? Why do you soil what is pure with your 
sordid argument?’ (CE III 2 24). 
 Gregory’s focus on Eunomius’ sloppy logic helps to define Eunomius’ character: it undermines his 
much-vaunted claim to precision or a)kri/beia in theology and it paints him as a bad pupil of Aristotle.  
But it also paints him as a bad arguer in another sense.  The aim of a rhetorician – especially in a law-
court – is to persuade his audience of a certain case and in order to persuade them, he needs to make 
clear distinctions between things: between guilt and innocence, between intended and unintended 
actions, between events which could be foreseen and those which could not.  Therefore, a substantial 
part of the rhetorician’s training was a training in how to argue by making proper distinctions (such as 
those achievable through Aristotelian logic).56  A rhetorician who could not make these clearly was 
simply a bad rhetorician.   
 So, as we have seen, Gregory accuses Eunomius of being a sloppy, and thus a bad, arguer.  On 
the other hand, however, Gregory often admits that his opponents’ arguments are effective: in that 
sense he can argue well.  Thus, Gregory associates himself with a long tradition of accusing rhetoricians 
with sophistry – a kind of intellectual enquiry which had abandoned the love of wisdom (philosophia) for 
techniques of persuasion: 
Is he by these efforts deliberately putting forward such propositions against the truth, or 
using tricks (tai=j a)pa&taij) to test the insensitivity of his followers, whether they can 
detect the elementary flaw in the logic (to_n paidiw&dh paralogismo_n tou~ 
sofi/smatoj), or whether they are unaware of such an obvious trick (a)pa&thn)? I do not 
think any one is so stupid that he does not see the trick (a)pa&thn) over the use of the 
same word, by which Eunomius deceived (parakrou&etai) himself and those who think 
like him.57 
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 Lyman, ‘A topography of heresy, 59-61 
55
 Note that Gregory’s accusation is that this mixing happens in the one semi-divine nature of the Son, not between the 
human and divine natures (as in Gregory’s Christology: cross-reference to Andrew Radde-Gallwitz paper on CE III 3?) 
56
 On the importance of learning to argue (over stylistic refinement) see Heath, Menander, e.g. xiii, xvi. 
57
 CE III 10 20 
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Compare this with a similar passage from CE III 2: 
That is how our clever wordsmith (o( sofo_j logogra&foj) has somewhere laid to rest his 
famous dialectical skill (th_n poluqru&lhton dialektikh_n), and before demonstrating the 
matter in question, tells his fairy tale as if it were to children, this fraudulent (a)pathlh\n) 
and unreasoned (a)kata/skeuon) nonsense of his version of doctrine; he tells it like a story 
at a drunken party.58 
In both passages Gregory associates bad logic with deception, and – moreover – the  deception of 
followers who are described as having childlike innocence.  Here, rhetoric does not represent the fair 
and manly competition between two advocates in a law-court nor a contest between two athletes; 
rather, here rhetoric is a tool for deception used by someone who knows exactly to prey on its power to 
deceive the weak.  Furthermore, in both passages, Eunomius’ logic is agreed to be effective (i.e. 
persuasive) even though it is imperfect: in the first it is said to have ‘an elementary flaw’, in the second it 
is associated with the telling of myths or fairy-story stories and is described as a)kata/skeuon, which can 
mean having an ‘unelaborate’ or style, or ‘unprepared’ or ‘disordered’ in argumental structure.   
Similarly, when Gregory compares Eunomius’ argument to Circe’s potion in the Odyssey (CE III 2 77), the 
remarkable thing is that Eunomius is persuasive despite the fact that he contradicts himself.  Unlike 
Odysseus’ men Eunomius’ victims do not even know they have been duped, so total is Eunomius’ 
deception.   
 In order to explain how Eunomius is ‘good’ rhetorician in the sense that he succeeds in his 
deception, even though he argues badly according to the strict rules of logic, I suggest that Gregory 
implies that Eunomius dominates his opponents by technique (te/xnh).59  The accusation of te/xnh or 
texnologi/a was a common rhetorical device used by one speaker to establish his superiority over 
another: in a tradition stemming from Plato, it was common for speakers to portray their opponents as 
using speech that was effectively persuasive, but which was not appropriately subordinated to more 
fundamental ethical concerns.  Plato argued that sophists failed to guide their arguments by dialectical 
wisdom and self-knowledge; Athenian orators claimed their opponents failed to subordinate te/xnh to 
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 CE III 2,92 
59
 Lim ?? First, Gregory is arguing that Eunomius’ theology is technical, and ascriptural – a ‘Christianity for “experts” ’. 
Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus, p.94, citing CE I 14.   
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civic virtues.60  For Quintilian the ideal orator was the bonus vir dicendi peritus (‘the good man skilled in 
speech’).61  Te/xnh was thus deceptive (indeed, the word had resonances with the practice of magic).62   
 In their most blunt form, accusations of texnologi/a opposed the ‘philosopher’ (speaker) to the 
‘rhetorician’ (opponent); usually, however, the opposition was more subtle.  Writers, for example, might 
admit their own rhetorical training but accuse their opponents of a particularly instrumentalised focus 
on the techniques of argument (often called sophistry or logographia).63  This is why the Cappadocians 
accuse Eunomius of being a logographos, obsessed with technique, but themselves accept and own 
Eunomius’ accusation that they attempt ‘writing without training in logic’ (CE III 10,54).64  Against this, 
they portray themselves as men of broad education (paideia) and accuse Eunomius of suffering from 
a)maqi/a and being a)paideu/toj.  Both Lim and Vaggione see this rhetorical construction of different 
forms of education as prominent in the debates between Eunomius on the one side and Basil and the 
two Gregories on the other: although they interpret the opposition in rather different ways, both agree 
that the Cappadocians try to contrast their preferance for plain speech, broad education and honest 
intent with Eunomius’ verbal complexity, technical education and dubious motives.65   
 This general point about te/xnh is important for our understanding of CE III, because it shows that 
underlying Gregory’s assessment of Eunomius’ argument is this ancient contrast between ‘good’ (plain, 
honest, truthful) speech and ‘bad’ (technical, tricksy) speech.  This is not the same as Gregory 
contrasting his ‘philosophy’ against Eunomius’ ‘rhetoric’ for, as we have seen, he critiques Eunomius’ 
use of both philosophy aInd rhetoric.  Rather, Gregory is claiming that Eunomius is a bad philosopher 
and a bad rhetorician – despite the apparent success of his arguments.  It is in order to explain that 
success that Gregory has to turn to Eunomius’ argumentative technique and claim that it is that by 
which he persuades his followers, not by any deeper merit in his argument.66  This explains why a good 
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 Hesk, J. ‘The rhetoric of anti-rhetoric in Athenian oratory’, in Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne (ed) Performance culture 
and Athenian democracy (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1999), 217. 
61
 See Quintilian Instituo oratoria I praef. 8; II 15,1; II 16,1; XII 1,1; c.f. ‘Introduction’ Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, vols. I-V, 
Donald Russell (tr.) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 5.  Cicero, although he reports various point-of-view in 
De oratore also inclines to the view that the good orator must have a good grasp of philosophy, inlcuding ethics. 
62
 Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus, 93. 
63
 Hesk, J. ‘The rhetoric of anti-rhetoric’, 217; Lim, Public Disputation, 127. 
64
 Although logogra&foj could be a neutral term simply distinguishing a writer of prose from a poet or dramatist, in CE III 
Gregory very often uses the term in contexts where he is emphasising Eunomius’ bad literary style (see e.g. 1,83; 5,18; 5,25; 
9,31; 9.42) or claiming that he is engaged in deceit (see e.g. 1,1; 2,92; 2,100; 2,152; 5,16; 7,8; 8,13,32).  Tellingly, the other 
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and Aeschines.  See e.g. Aeschines, In Ctesiphontem 173; Demosthenes, De falsa legatione, 246 (Aeschines calls people 
sophists and  logogra&foi, but he is guilty of his own charge).  See Hesk, J. ‘The rhetoric of anti-rhetoric’, 213ff. 
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 ref. to relevant chapters  
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 Contra Vaggione, if one understands Gregory’s comments about Eunomius’ use of te/xnh as referring to rhetorical 
techniques of persuasion, as well as philosophical texnologi/a, this makes Eunomius’ popularity easier, not harder, to 
explain: Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus, 99-100.  
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part of CE III is concerned with the issue of literary style.  These sections are not, I would argue, 
peripheral to Gregory’s argument, but help him establish fundamentally what is wrong with Eunomius – 
but also why he is dangerous. 
 
3. Eunomius’ literary style in CE III.10 and related passages 
 In this section I will suggest that Gregory’s critique of Eunomius’ literary style goes beyond the 
mere suggestion that it is bad.  Rather, I will argue that the particular kind of faults that Gregory draws 
to our attention, help him simultaneously to explain how Eunomius wins over his audience and to 
construct an unflattering portrait of his opponent.  In order to investigate this, I will compare Gregory’s 
comments with some passages in Longinus’ On the Sublime.  I am using this to illustrate the kind of 
context in which Gregory’s comments should be understood: I am interested less in Gregory’s actual 
sources than in how the prose of CE III 10 functions.  Nevertheless it is a good text to use for at least 
three reasons: first it is possible, even probable, that Gregory knew this text;67 second, it provides a 
useful complement to the very wide range of sources discussed by Matthieu Cassin,68 thirdly, Longinus’ 
emphasis on sublimity in the ideas as well as the style of the treatise provides a useful example of how 
ancient literary criticism was not simply limited to matter of form: rather, Longinus and other 
philosophising literary critics seem to be imply that defects in style reflect defects at a deeper level 
(much as nineteenth century physiognomists would attempt to trace moral defects in someone’s 
face).69 
 The most obvious literary reference comes right at the end of CE III 10, where Gregory ridicules 
Eunomius for his ‘Demosthenic intensity’: 
This is what we, who ”set our hands to writing without training in logic”, as our abuser 
says, offer rustically in our local dialect (dia_ th~j e0pixwri/ou glw&tthj u(pagroiki/zomen) 
to the new Paianeus. As to why he has struggled against this contradiction, shooting at us 
hot and fire-breathing words with the force of a Demosthenes, let those who enjoy a 
laugh go to our orator’s actual writings. Our own is not too difficult to put into action for 
refuting the doctrines of the impious, but for poking fun at the ignorance of the 
uneducated it is quite unsuitable. 70 
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 I assume in what follows that Gregory of Nyssa was aware of some contemporary literary debates.  See e.g. Malcolm 
Heath’s detailed argument that he had read the treatise On the Sublime, conventionally ascribed to Longinus: Heath, 
Malcolm, ‘Echoes of Longinus in Gregory of Nyssa’, in Vigiliae Christianae 53 (1999), 395-400;. 
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 L’écriture de la polémique. 
69
 Another classic example, in rather a different context, of ethicising literary criticism is Horace, Ars Poetica and Epistulae. 
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Here and elsewhere in CE III, Gregory compares his opponent to Demosthenes: Eunomius is said to utter 
his words with ‘the fury of a Demosthenes’ (Dhmosqenikw|~ ga_r qumw~|) or ‘with the force of a 
Demosthenes’ (kata_ th_n Dhmosqenikh_n eu)toni/an) and he is described as ‘another’ or ‘a new Paianian’ 
(a1lloj tij… Paianieu_j, to_n ne/on Paianie/a: Paianeus being the family name of Demosthenes, 
according to the Suda).71  But in what does the alleged similarity between Eunomius and Demosthenes 
lie?  And why might Gregory want to make such a comparison?72 
 In the extract quoted above, the quality of being ‘Demosthenic’ seems to consist in two things: 
first, emotional intensity and secondly a more strictly literary quality of his language which is associated 
with being heavy or distended.  These qualities are alleged against Eunomius in CE III 10 and implicitly or 
explicity contrasted with Gregory’s own supposed style.  For example, with regard to the emotional level 
of his language, Eunomius is described as speaking with ‘fervour’ (qumw|~: §50) and his words are 
described as ‘hot and fire-breathing’ (tou_j qermou_j e0kei/nouj kai\ pu~r pne/ontaj lo&gouj: §54).  This 
recalls Longinus’ description of Demosthenes’ rhetoric as having ‘abundant warmth and passionate 
glow’ (polu\ to_ dia&puron e1xei kai\ qumikw~j e0kflego&menon); it is ‘more emotional’ (paqhtikw&teroj) 
than Plato’s prose.73  While a rhetorician, as we have seen, was expected to engage his hearers’ 
emotions in order to persuade them, the emotional tone had to be well-judged.  Therefore, Longinus, 
like other literary critics, criticises emotion which is ‘misplaced’ (a!kairon) or ‘unrestrained’ (a!metron).74  
Furthermore he makes a connection between out-of-control emotion and out-of-control prose:   
Writers often behave as if they were drunk and give way to outbursts of emotion which the 
subject no longer warrants, but which are private to themselves and consequently tedious, so 
that to an audience which feels none of it their behaviour looks unseemly.75 
As we have seen, Gregory compares Eunomius’ speech to story-telling at a drunken party (CE III 2,92); 
drunkenness is often associated with excessive or inappropriate emotion and Gregory certainly uses the 
image to indicate an inappropriate and probably excessive mode of speech.  Elsewhere, Gregory makes 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
a)nti/qesin tau&thn dihgwni/sato tou_j qermou_j e0kei/nouj kai\ pu~r pne/ontaj lo&gouj kata_ th_n Dhmosqenikh_n eu)toni/an 
kaq' h(mw~n proballo&menoj, o3soij kaq' h(donh&n e0sti to_ gela~n, au)toi=j e0perxe/sqwsan toi=j gegramme/noij tw|~ r(h&tori. 
to_ ga_r h(me/teron pro_j me\n e1legxon tw~n th~j a)sebei/aj dogma&twn ou) li/an duski/nhton, pro_j de\ to_ kwmw|dei=n th_n 
a)maqi/an tw~n  a)paideu&twn pantelw~j e0stin a)nepith&deion. 
71
 All quotations from CE III 10,50 and 54.  See Suda d454 [see www.stoa.org/sol] For similar expressions for Demosthenes, 
see e.g. Plato Euthydemus 273a7; Libanius, Orations, 55:16:1. 
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 On this theme see Cassin, L’écriture de la polémique, 289-92: Cassin argues that the comparison with Demosthenes serves 
to disparage Eunomius; I want to make a more specific point about the particular way in which Eunomius mimics, but fails to 
achieve Demosthenic greatness. 
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 Longinus De sublimitate 12.3: polu\ to_ dia&puron e1xei kai\ qumikw~j e0kflego&menon (Longinus, De Sublimitate in Poetics, 
Aristotle. On the Sublime, Longinus. On Style, Demetrius (Stephen Halliwell, Donald Russell, Doreen C. Innes and W. R. 
Roberts (trans); Loeb Classical Library, 199; Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1995). 
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 Longinus De sublimitate 3.5 
75
 Longinus 3.5 
 19 
the connection between emotion and style more explicitly (CE III 10,45) – but, surprisingly, he appears 
to apply it to himself: 
However, I am aware that my book is getting somewhat disorderly (u9pataktou=ntoj tou= 
lo&gou).  It does not stay in its correct course (tw|~ kaqh/konti dro&mw|), but like a hot and 
headstrong foal (kata_ tou_j qermou&j te kai\ qumw&deij tw~n pw&lwn) is being carried away by 
the arguments of our adversaries towards the absurdities (a!topa) of their position. It must 
therefore be allowed to defy the rein immoderately (pe/ra tou~ me/trou… a)fhnia&zonta) in order 
to deal with absurdities (tw~n a)to&pwn). The kindly hearer will pardon the things said, not 
attributing the absurdity (th\n a)topi/an) arising from the study to us, but to those who lay down 
bad principles.76 
The metaphor of the chariot in the hippodrome and the description of the ‘hot’ and ‘spirited’ colts 
threatening to pull the chariot in the wrong direction, surely recalls Plato’s chariot motif, which was a 
favourite with Gregory.77  If so, the implication might be that Gregory’s composition (lo&goj) is running 
away with him, because his emotions are running away with him – perhaps because he is angry with his 
opponent?  If he does not keep his words in check, Gregory’s lo&goj will not demonstrate the admirable 
rhetorical quality of moderation (it will be pe/ra tou~ me/trou – compare a!metron in Longinus 3.5).  The 
image of the chariot running off course not only describes Gregory’s own lo&goj, but mimics Eunomius’ 
arguments which are a!topa, nonsense – literally ‘out of place’.  This perhaps alerts the audience to the 
fact that Gregory is excusing himself on the grounds that it is not his own emotions, but Eunomius 
argument which has caused him to go off the rails.  Gregory has to go pe/ra tou~ me/trou in order to 
counter Eunomius’ a)topi/a; arguments which go beyond the bounds of normal dialectic, require an 
answer which similarly goes beyond the bounds.  Thus, in a typical example of rhetorical reversal, 
Gregory apparently portrays himself as the speaker whose prose is out of control, while all the time he is 
in fact imputing that fault to Eunomius.78  Note that the faults in his own prose in §45 – being like the 
‘hot’ (qermou&j) and ‘spirited’ (qumw&deij) horses – are faults which he actually blames on the influence 
of Eunomius and are precisely the qualities he then attributes to Eunomius in §54 (qumw|~; tou_j qermou_j 
lo&gouj). 
 Secondly, Eunomius’ prose is alleged to be Demosthenic, because of its intensity and its 
weightiness.  Thus, Eunomius is said to ‘stretch’ or ‘tense’ his argument with Demosthenic fervour 
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 e.g. An et res PG 46 49,44 and 61,44; Virg XXII. 
78
 Gregory’s comments on out-of-control prose in §45 may refer back to the previous paragraph, which does contain a rather 
long and ungainly sentence: CE III 10.45 (GNO II 306,27-307,7).  Aristotle compares an over-long sentence to a race track 
(dro&moj): if runners cannot see the end of it they pant and become out of breath (Aristotle, Rhetorica 1409a). 
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(Dhmosqenikw|~ ga_r qumw|~ to_n e9autou~ lo&gon tonw&saj: §50).  As Stuart Hall makes clear in his 
translation, the context is agonistic (e0n tw|~ kaq' h(mw~n a)gw~ni: §50) and with the word tonw&saj 
Gregory seems to be alluding to the tensing of a bow, an image which is reinforced with a reference to 
the ‘sharpness of the rhetor’ (to_ drimu_ tou~ r(h&toroj §50).  I suggest, however, that there is also a 
second range of reference in play.  In Greek literary criticism, words compounded from the root ton- 
were used to describe the quality of writing – specifically, the intensity of prose or its lack.  Generally, 
eu0toni/a denoted a quality appropriate to weighty or serious subject-matter: the opposite of informality.  
Hence, when Menander Rhetor describes two possible levels at which one could write a marriage-hymn, 
the more formal composition is described as sunto/nwj (and the other suggrafikw/teron  - ‘closer to 
non-oratorical prose’).79  In his Epithalamium for Severus, Himerius rejects ‘serious music’ (su/ntonon 
a(rmoni/an) in favour of a more relaxed style.80  In one of his orations, the orator Themistius contrasts 
Platonic harmony (Platonikh\n a(rmoni/an) with Demosthenic intensity (Dhmoste/neion tonon).81  One 
can see that, although the subject-matter is equally serious, the pace and structure of Plato’s sentences 
are rather different from those of Demosthenes’ speeches: in particular, Plato’s prose is more 
conversational.  Consequently when, in CE III 10,54 Gregory says that Eunomius’ discourse has th_n 
Dhmosqenikh_n eu)toni/an, I suggest that he is not just saying that Eunomius is being forceful: rather, he is 
also suggesting that Eunomius is aiming at quality of ‘intensity’ which is appropriate for self-consciously 
serious prose.  This is confirmed, I think, by the fact that Gregory refers to Eunomius in CE III 4,35 as ‘the 
excessive wordsmith and his intense oratory against us’ (to_n sfodro_n logogra&fon kai\ th_n su&ntonon 
e0kei/nhn kaq' h(mw~n r(htorei/an).82   
 Finally, Gregory describing Eunomius’ speech as being ‘heavy and hard to resist’ (baru_ kai\ 
dusantagw&niston: §50) and having o1gkoj (bulk).  To understand these terms in a literary-critical 
context, one needs to look more closely at Longinus’ analysis of  u3yoj – usually translated ‘sublimity’ in 
English.  He tries to identify not only which authors achieve this key quality of great writing, but how it is 
achieved.  His analysis is quite subtle, for he argues that sublimity of thought (we might say content), 
should be distinguished from sublime style (or form):  ‘and so even without being spoken the bare idea 
often of itself wins admiration for its inherent grandeur.  How grand, for instance, is the silence of Ajax’s 
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 Menander Rhetor, On the division of Eipideictic Speeches II 6 (399,17-18): The Epithalamium (Menander Rhetor. A 
commentary, Malcolm Heath (tr and comm.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 134). 
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 Himerius Or. 9.32; see: Himerius, Man and the Word, The Orations of Himerius tr. Robert J. Penella (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2007), 146 (Or. 9 §3). 
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 My translation, heightening the literary-critical sense of Gregory’s words: note the very emphatic combination of the 
words logogra&fon and su&ntonon and r(htorei/an with the adjective sfodro_n. 
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in the Summoning of the ghosts, more sublime than any speech!’83  Longinus  also asserts that u9yoj is a 
mean between two poles.  If one aims for a sublime style but fails to reach it, then one’s writing exhibits 
weakness (a0sqenei/a), aridity (chro/thj) and frigidity (tou~ yuxrou~).84  If one aims at a sublime content 
but fails, one’s writing has ‘puerility’ (meirakiw~dej); it is ‘utterly abject, mean-spirited and… the most 
ignoble of faults’ (tapeino_n e0c o#lon kai\ mikpo&yuxon kai\... kako_n a)genne/staton).85  On the other 
hand, if one over-achieves and exceeds the mean of sublimity, one’s writing has turgidity (o0gkoj): 
‘Tumours are bad things whether in books or bodies, those empty inflations, void of sincerity, as likely as 
not producing the opposite of the effect intended.’86  The contention that Gregory is himself using 
o0gkoj as a literary-critical term is strengthened by the fact that he consistently uses it in places where 
he is criticising Eunomius’ style, as well as his ideas.  In CE III 3,28, for example, Eunomius adds a 
specious mass to his arguments by piling on mere insults; ‘perhaps such a verbal assault is customary for 
rhetoricians following some professional principle, invented to add weight to the charge’.87  A similar 
accusation – and a similarly literary context – underlies Gregory’s use of o1gkoj at the beginning of CE III 
7, where Gregory imagines Eunomius almost sailing up to heaven, with his ‘high-flown language’ (tou_j 
u(yhlote/rouj lo&gouj) and swelling with ‘hollow pride’ (o)gkw&saj e0n diake/nw| fush&mati).  In sharp 
contrast to Gregory’s motif of the soul rising to God, this is an undesirable ascent: what is required is 
some intellectual weight: Eunomius is ‘like a ship without ballast’.88  But the best example is CE III 5,25, 
where Gregory compares Eunomius’ words to patched-together rags, to bubbles which rise then 
disappear into thin air and to a ‘foamy mass’ (tij a)frw&dhj o1gkoj) which is carried down-stream but 
disappears when it strikes something solid.  The point here is that Eunomius’ prose has a specious 
substantiality to it: it appears to have body and weight, until it is challenged.89  In this context, one can 
see that Gregory’s description of Eunomius’ argument being ‘heavy and hard to resist’ (baru_ kai\ 
dusantagw&niston: §50) is very sarcastic. 
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IVe siècle : Grégoire de Nysse, Contre Eunome III (Thèse de doctorat; Université Paris IV – Sorbonne, 2009), 277-84. 
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 It is worth staying a little while longer with Longinus’ analysis of u3yoj in order to see how it 
relates to his reading of Demosthenes.  Firstly, as we have briefly mentioned above, Longinus, like 
Themistius, compared Plato with Demosthenes: 
the orator, being more emotional, has abundant warmth and passionate glow, whereas Plato, 
steady in his majestic and stately dignity, is less intense, though of course in no way frigid.90 
So Plato is less intense than Demosthenes (ou0k e0pe/straptai); but Longinus’ point is that they both 
achieve the sublime, albeit in different ways.  Longinus expands on Demosthenes’ style later on, in 
comparison with the orator Hyperides.  The latter, Longinus argues, has more good qualities than 
Demosthenes: like a pentathlete, Hyperides always comes second in everything, but comes out first on 
points.  His particular virtues are: simplicity, variety of tone, pleasing characterisation; his urbanity is 
demonstrated in his well-judged and sophisticated use of humour and satire.  He can excite pity 
appropriately.  He narrates myths with appropriate fullness and poetic style and is a fluent orator on 
other more prosaic themes.  Demosthenes, however, although technically inferior to Hyperides, has the 
grandeur which Hyperides lacks:  
But Demosthenes no sooner ‘takes up the tale’ than he shows the merits of great genius in their 
most consummate form, sublime intensity (u9yhgori/a ton/on), living emotion (e1myuxa pa/qh), 
redundance, readiness, speed – where speed is in season (kai/rion) – and his own 
unapproachable vehemence and power (a0pro&siton deino/thta kai\ dun/amin): concentrating in 
himself all these heaven-sent gifts - it would be impious to call then human – he thus uses the 
beauties he possesses to win a victory over all others that even compensates for his weaknesses, 
and out-thunders, as it were, and out-shines orators of every age.  You could sooner open your 
eyes to the descent of a thunderbolt than face his repeated outbursts of emotion (toi=j 
e0pallh/loij… pa/qesin) without blinking.91 
 Three conclusions can be drawn from Longinus’ analysis of Demosthenes.  First, that great orator 
tends towards the copious use of emotion in his speech; secondly, the effect of Demosthenes’ speech 
matches its emotional intensity: it is powerful, like a lightning bolt (it has deino&thj), and in style it is 
intense (ton/oj); thirdly, Demosthenes has u9yoj.  Somehow, however, despite the danger of over-doing 
it, and despite his lack of precise technique (compared to someone like Hyperides), Demosthenes judges 
the use of his grandeur and power so that he achieves u9yoj.  As Longinus consistently emphasises 
throughout On the Sublime, u9yoj is not just a matter of style: no amount of style will help if you are not 
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also sublimity and passion (16.2; 17.2). 
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high-minded: ‘Sublimity is the echo of a noble mind (megalofrosu/nhj)… It is impossible that those 
whose thoughts and habits all their lives are petty and servile should produce anything wonderful, 
worthy of immortal life.  No, a grand style is the natural product of those whose ideas are weighty’.92  
The clear implication of Longinus’ analysis is that without such nobility of thought, Demosthenes’ prose 
would be turgid, like the swollen and unhealthy tumour.  The impression given is that Demosthenes’ 
prose is balanced on a knife-edge: any more emotional power, any more stylistic bombast or any less 
sublimity of thought and it would over-balance.  While Plato’s writing – consistently magnificent, solemn 
and grand – is easy to accommodate to Longinus’ notion of the literary golden mean, Demosthenes’ 
prose challenges it.  Somehow, just somehow, he manages to be excessive, but get away with it. 
 The contrast with Eunomius, however, should be clear: Eunomius mimics Demosthenes’ intensity 
of emotion and his powerful style,93 but he completely lacks sublimity of thought because his theology is 
in error. If ‘a grand style is the natural product of those whose ideas are weighty’, Gregory has shown 
repeatedly in CE III that Eunomius’ ideas are precisely not that: they rise like bubbles and burst in the air.  
Therefore, while Demosthenes attains to u9yoj, Eunomius only manages o0gkoj. 
 This point seems to be emphasised by the way in which Gregory contrasts Eunomius with the 
writers of Scripture: it seems that they have sublime thoughts, by definition because they are inspired 
by God.  We have already noted Longinus’ use of u9yoj to denote the sublime.  As Longinus uses 
megalofrosu/nh and related compounds to describe those who have sublime thoughts so a similar kind 
of vocabulary is used by Gregory to describe Scriptural writers: David is ‘great’ (tou= mega/lou Dabi\d);94 
Paul possesses a0postolikh/j megalofwni/aj;95 John is o9 u9yhloj I0wa/nnhj96 who has a thundering 
voice (h9 brontai/a fwnh\).97  These are all in profound contrast with Eunomius, whose attempts at 
sublimity, even in mere style rather than content, are risible: 
for indeed to be within hearing, and to remain unmoved, is an impossibility, when he says with 
such sublime and magnificent verbosity (e0k th~j u(yhlh~j e0kei/nhj kai\ megalofuou~j 
eu)glwtti/aj), “Where additional words amount to additional blasphemy, it is by half as much 
more tranquillizing to be silent than to speak.” Let those laugh at these expressions who know 
which of them are fit to be believed, and which only to be laughed at while we scrutinize the 
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keenness of those syllogisms (to_ drimu\ tw~n sullogismw~n) with which he tries to tear our 
system to pieces…98 
Here u(yhlo&j and megalofuh/j are used sarcastically.  Equally sarcastic is the reference to the keenness 
(to_ drimu_) of Eunomius’ argument – a quality which as we have seen Gregory again sarcastically 
attributes to Eunomius in CE III 10,50.  Finally, we have the idea that Eunomius’ words are only to be 
laughed at.  This perhaps invites a further comparison with Demosthenes, whom Longinus argued was 
incapable of wit (‘When he is forced into attempting a jest or a witty passage, he rather raises the laugh 
against himself’) and calls to mind Gregory’s closing invitation in CE III 10,54 to laugh at the rest of what 
Eunomius wrote.99   
 By contrast, Gregory, implicitly presents himself as the true interpreter of the great voices of 
Scripture: he, therefore, is able to pass on their u9yoj by quoting it and by his interpretation which is 
accurate (a)kribw~j), because inspired by the Holy Spirit.100  But he is quick to claim that he has no 
pretensions to high-flown style.  Rather, he admits to his ‘rustic dialect’ in the passage from CE III 54 
quoted above.  But even this, I suggest, must be taken not just with a pinch of salt, but taken in its 
context.101  Firstly, the accusation of being rustic (a)groikoj) was a mutual one, thrown back and forth 
between the Cappadocians and Eunomius.102  Secondly, it was Plato himself, who jokingly apologised for 
his rustic and somewhat childish means of expression in the Thaeatetus: ‘Why are you silent? I hope, 
Theodorus, I am not rude (a0groiki/zomai), through my love of discussion and my eagerness to make us 
converse and show ourselves friends and ready to talk to one another’.103  Finally, being  a)groikoj was 
connected to a plain or middle rhetorical style (not necessarily a bad thing).104  Could it be, then, that 
Gregory is setting himself against Eunomius, as the ‘less intense’, but ‘steady and majestic’ Plato?  In any 
case, in these final sections of book 10 Gregory is implying that Eunomius wins over his audience, not by 
carefully-prepared argument, nor by great theology, but with forceful and emotional speech – and that 
nothing of substance underlies it.   
 
Conclusion 
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 One effect of Gregory’s rhetorical techniques is to give the CE a strong agonistic tone.  Gregory 
heightens this with the use of various images all of which emphasize the public nature of their rivalry.  
Some are taken from Scripture, such as his use of the story of David and Goliath to representing himself 
and Eunomius in CEII.1-11,  Others are classical or contemporary images.  For example, CE III begins with 
Gregory announcing: 
at the games, it is the rule that either the opponent refuses altogether to go on and 
voluntarily concedes victory to the winner, or else he is thrown three times in accordance 
with the rules of the competition, and thus on the verdict of the umpires (th|~ kri/sei tw~n 
brabeuo&ntwn) the winner receives by triumphal proclamation the honour of a crown.105  
Then in CE III 3 Gregory uses the image of the law-court: 
Those of you who sit in judgment (dika&zontej) for the truth by reading this, ‘Judge true 
judgment’ (Zech 7.9), not awarding the prize (do&ntej ta_ nikhth&ria) to contention for 
previously held opinion, but to the truth demonstrated by careful argument.  Let the 
accuser of our position [i.e. Eunomius] be called first, reading out his words as in a court 
of law.106  
As we have seen, Gregory appears to reprise some of this agonistic imagery in book 10, for example 
evoking a chariot-race in CE III 10,45.  The point that I would like to stress, however, is that this imagery 
not only sets Gregory against Eunomius, but clearly calls on his audience to decide the victory of one 
side or the other.  In other words, it demands of its audience an active role and Gregory implies that 
important consequences (for themselves, for the church, for the truth), hang on their choice.   
 In Aristotle’s classic distinction, the kind of speech is said to depend on the audience and the 
‘time’ of the subject-matter.107  Thus, forensic and deliberative speeches are delivered to those who are 
to make a decision about something.  In the former case they are called to decide about an event in the 
past (is the accused guilty?); in the latter, about future action (what should we do?).  Epideictic oratory, 
however, is delivered to ‘spectators’ (I 3,2), who listen to speeches about the present and are not called 
to make a decision about the subject-matter of the speech (although they may be asked to give a prize 
for the best speaker108).  It is tempting to think that Gregory’s rhetorical strategy in CE is a form of 
epideictic, specifically the kind that directed blame (psogos) on to someone.  Perhaps the wrestling 
motif heightens this sense that he is performing before an audience of spectators whose only choice is 
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whether he convincingly disparages his subject.  However, the references to the law-court and the use 
of the kind of polemic suited to political oratory suggest otherwise: Gregory seems to be drawing his 
audience in closer to the subject-matter: they are not spectators, but decision-makers and their choice 
of loyalty will determine the direction of the church community.  As such, he is asking them to judge 
Eunomius’ actions in the past, but make a commitment about their own loyalties in the future.109 
 A second effect of Gregory’s use of ēthos and pathos in CE is to isolate Eunomius.  While he 
focuses directly on Eunomius’ character, Gregory is rather more silent with regard to his own ēthos, 
often contrasting Eunomius either with Basil (most famously at the beginning of CEI), or with the 
orthodox church as a whole.  In general his strategy in CE III is to isolate Eunomius by portraying him as a 
lone figure distinct from the wider body of truly religious Christians.110  Not only does this undermine 
Eunomius’ credibility (if he is right, why is he on his own?), but it fits the polemical strategy which 
Michel Barnes identifies in his paper on CE III 6.  Barnes argues that Gregory of Nyssa refutes homoian 
theology in general by launching a direct attack on Eunomius in particular.  He contrasts Gregory’s 
strategy with that of Athanasius, who tends to assume that anyone who was against him was ‘Arian’, 
thus reducing a range of opposing views to a homogenous party.  Consequently, Athanasius often 
presents himself as a lone heroic figure defending the faith against a phalanx dressed against him.  
Gregory, by contrast, places himself in a crowd of orthodoxy and isolates Eunomius.  There may well 
have been some in his audience who had their suspicions about pro-Nicene theology; but by demonising 
the lone figure of Eunomius, Gregory invites any waverers to side with himself.  In short, while 
Athanasius assumes that anyone who is not for him is against him (and is an Arian), Gregory’s rhetorical 
move is to assert that anyone who is not for Eunomius can be part of the true church.111  But Gregory 
has several ways of persuading his audience that Eunomius is not truly ‘one of us’, referring to 
Eunomius’ errors in logic and literary style as well as theology: the problem is not that that Aristotle and 
Demosthenes are bad, but that Eunomius mimics, whilst being unable to attain their level.   
 Finally, Gregory’s emphasis on ēthos and pathos in CE III, might help one to understand the 
work’s structure.  It is clear that Gregory closes before he has dealt with all of Eunomius’ Apology for the 
Apology.112  Yet he indicates that CE III 10,54 is the end of his own work: ‘let those who enjoy a laugh go 
to our orator’s actual writings’, he writes, implying that he has gone as far as he can.  Thus CE III closes 
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on a curiously personal and literary note, instead of with a summing-up of Eunomius’ arguments.113  
However, even though one might question whether Gregory ends his treatise well, there are clear signs 
throughout CE III 10 that it is a planned end: for example, in CE III 10,1 he says that the argument he 
discusses is the ‘chief point’ of Eunomius’ doctrine, which signals that book 10 should be read as some 
kind of ‘summing up’ or anakephalaiōsis – the question is, what kind of closing is it?   
 Some teachers of rhetoric, such as Quintilian, suggested that a strong emotional tone was 
appropriate for the end of a speech.  Quintilian remarks that there are two kinds of epilogue,114 one 
focusing on the facts (in rebus), the other on emotions (in adfectis).115  The former  ‘which is called in 
Greek the anakephalaiōsis’, consists of the repetition and collection of the facts or arguments.  It must 
be as brief as possible (brevissime), delivered with gravitas (pondere) and ‘enlivened with appropriate 
opinions and varied with figures’, lest it should become repetitive.116  The former kind of ending put 
more weight on the emotions.  Although he says that Athenian law-courts forbad and philosophers were 
suspicious about appeals to the emotions, Quintilian argues that they ‘are necessary if there are no 
other means for securing the victory of truth, justice and the public interest’.117  Indeed, he asserts that 
the close of a case is a particularly appropriate point for the use of appeals to emotion: 
For, if we have spoken well in the rest of our speech, we shall now have the judges on our 
side, and shall be in a position, now that we have emerged from the reefs and the shoals, 
to spread all our canvas, while since the chief task of the peroration consists of 
amplification, we may legitimately make free use of words and reflexions that are 
magnificent and ornate.  It is at the close of our drama that we must really stir the 
theatre, when we have reached the place for the phrase with which the old tragedies and 
comedies used to end, ‘Friends give us your applause’.118  
Without making any claims that Gregory was directly influenced by Quintilian, in this paper I have 
suggested Gregory that is doing precisely what Quintilian recommended.  Viewed as theology or 
philosophy his arguments in book 10 are not clearly-developed and repeat material that has been used 
before; viewed as passages which support and sum up Gregory’s character-assassination of Eunomius 
they make much more sense. Thus, the argument against Eunomius’ alleged claim that the Father was 
‘God’ to the Son began with the highly emotional labelling of Eunomius as Anti-Christ; the history of 
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salvation was designed to evoke two emotions: gratitude for redemption and anger at Eunomius’ 
alleged Satan-like deceptive powers.  Similarly, arguments about Eunomius’ use of words such as ‘true’ 
or ‘light’ focus on the claims that his logical technique is futile and lax, rather than really engaging 
deeply with Eunomius’ arguments.  Finally, Gregory’s focus on literary criticism not only provides the 
audience with a welcome ‘purple patch’ of entertaining prose, but seals the case against his enemy.  If 
you do persuade, Gregory says to his opponent, it is certainly not because of your theology (which is 
untraditional, ascriptural and demonic), nor your logic (which is very suspect).  In fact, it is not really 
because you are a good rhetorician: you may be effective in a minimalist sense, but at a more profound 
level yours is bad rhetoric, nothing more than immoral bombast.  And actually it makes me laugh.  After 
this vigorous three-fold attack on Eunomius’ theology, logic and rhetoric, Gregory retires from the fight. 
 Consequently, although I am in agreement with Matthieu Cassin’s argument that one needs to 
read the CE with full alertness to Gregory’s broad literary context and not treat it just as a technical 
theological treatise, I would like to push the argument further.119  Cassin has shown with great care and 
scholarship how fruitful it is to read Gregory as an ‘orateur’ as well as a ‘theologien’.  However, in 
suggesting, for example, that the passages of invective structure the work as a whole and prepare the 
audience with an attack on Eunomius’ character before attacking his ideas he still seems to assume a 
distinction between the two forms of attack: theology and invective.120  Where I would press Cassin’s 
argument further still is to suggest even more unity between the two kinds of attack: firstly, because the 
passages commenting on Eunomius’ method (his use of logic and style) treat his failings not just a 
failings of technique, but of ēthos and, secondly, because Gregory colours his theological arguments in 
such a way that they become part of his mode of rousing the passions of his audience.  Precisely 
because Gregory does not compartmentalise intellect and emotion in his thought (for example, in his 
account of the soul’s ascent to God), we should not compartmentalise them when it comes to analysing 
his writing – even if that leaves us with the uncomfortable thought that we too are liable to be moved 
by the power of his words. 
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